Whose Vote Counts? Minority Vote Dilution and Election Rights by Adams, Ross J.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 35 Voting Rights Symposium | New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Recovery Act (ECRA)
Symposium
January 1989
Whose Vote Counts? Minority Vote Dilution and
Election Rights
Ross J. Adams
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Voting Rights Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ross J. Adams, Whose Vote Counts? Minority Vote Dilution and Election Rights, 35 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 219 (1989)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/11
WHOSE VOTE COUNTS?
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION AND
ELECTION RIGHTS
What is the value of one man's vote? While the obvious answer is
"one man, one vote," some votes are worth less. Over the last one-
hundred years, minorities have battled to receive equal rights and op-
portunities. A primary struggle for minorities has been the fight for
equal access to political representation. Only through representation
will problems like educational inequality and housing discrimination be
eliminated.' Only since Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act2 (the
Act) in 1965 have minorities3 had a fair opportunity4 to become in-
volved in the political process.5 Discrimination did not simply disap-
pear, however, when Congress enacted the Act. Voting discrimination
1. Boyd & Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative
History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1347, 1348-52 (1982).
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 (1982)).
3. In addition to blacks, persons of Spanish heritage, Alaskan natives, American
Indians and Asian-Americans are the minorities specifically designated for coverage. S.
REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 11, 31-32 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 774, 797-98.
4. President Lyndon Johnson hailed the enactment of the Voting Rights Act as a
"triumph for freedom as huge as any ever won on any battlefield." S. REP. No. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, 4-5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177
(hereinafter SENATE REPORT).
5. The Senate Judiciary Committee wrote:
As a result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
cans can now vote and, equally important, have their vote count as fully as do the
votes of their fellow citizens. Men and women from racial and ethnic minorities
now hold public office in places where that was once impossible.
Id. at 181.
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persists in a variety of political bodies, including school boards, 6 state
senates,7 park districts,8 and congressional districts.9 Since 1965, one
of the most pervasive types of political discrimination has been vote
dilution. 0 The Supreme Court has found that vote dilution can be as
detrimental to a person's political rights as an absolute ban on voting.1'
Minority voters have adopted two major strategies to combat polit-
ical discrimination. The first is an equal protection claim 2 based on
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 3 Under this approach the
minority voter must show that he has been denied equal access to the
political process.14 Originally, the voter only had to demonstrate a dis-
criminatory result such as minority underrepresentation,"5 but after
Mobile v. Bolden,16 plaintiffs were required to show a discriminatory
purpose. The second method uses the Voting Rights Act of 1965'7
6. Potter v. Washington County, Florida, 563 F, Supp. 121 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (de-
fendant County admitted that school board at-large election scheme was
discriminatory).
7. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (North Carolina legislature multimem-
ber election scheme held discriminatory); see infra notes 108-123 and accompanying
text for discussion of Gingles.
8. McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1208 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (defendant
park district admitted that its at-large election scheme was discriminatory).
9. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527-28 (1969) (Court held that "as nearly
as practicable, one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's").
10. Vote dilution diminishes a minority group's political power by weakening the
effectiveness of its vote. In addition to at-large and multimember district schemes, other
methods of vote dilution are gerrymandering and annexation.
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Warren stated:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of repre-
sentative government. The right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting
the free exercise of the franchise.
Id.
12. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text for discussion of the equal access
argument.
15. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text for discussion of the results test.
16. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text for discussion
of Mobile.
17. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)).
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generally, and in particular section 2 of the Act as amended in 1982.18
After this amendment, the Voting Rights Act specifically requires only
a showing of a discriminatory result, not intent, after consideration of
all the circumstances. 19
A common method of vote dilution in city and county government
has been the use of at-large elections rather than district or ward elec-
tions. For example, a city of 100,000 people20 may have a five-person
city commission. If the city uses an at-large election scheme, all the
city's residents could vote for all five commission seats. A district sys-
tem would divide the city into five districts with approximately equal
populations.21 Then, each district composed of 20,000 people would
elect one commissioner. In essence, an at-large voting system permits
the political majority to dominate the election by minimizing the vot-
ing strength of minorities,2 2 especially where there is racially polarized
18. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 1973(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the total-
ity of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent
to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: PROVIDED,
That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982).
19. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Jones v. Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th
Cir. 1984).
20. For example, assume that the 100,000 people are all of voting age. The district
court in McNeil v. Springfield, 666 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (C.D. Ill. 1987), held that only
people of voting age should be counted to determine the existence of vote dilution.
Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued in McNeil and other cases that the Senate intended to
count all residents, not just those of voting age. See, e.g., Potter v. Washington County,
653 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Fla. 1986).
21. Some courts have permitted deviation from exact equality if the state can justify
it. In Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187 (1971), the Supreme Court found justification
for an 11.9% deviation from population equality within a county commission district.
See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for discussion of deviation from popula-
tion equality.
22. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
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voting.23
At-large elections are not unconstitutional or discriminatory per
se,24 but they do raise the spectre of discrimination.
25 The first 26
Supreme Court decision to address vote dilution was Reynolds v.
Sims.27 In Reynolds, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the equal protec-
tion clause protects the right to vote by requiring substantially equal
legislative representation apportioned on the basis of population.2 8 In
1964 the Alabama legislative districts were still apportioned as they
had been in 190029 even though there had been tremendous movement
from rural to urban areas.30 Because of this shift in population, people
in cities were underrepresented, whereas those in rural areas were over-
represented.31 Reapportionment was delayed in some areas for many
years. While this delay was not illegal,3 2 it left many urban dwellers
underrepresented 33and politically overshadowed by rural residents.34
23. Racially polarized voting occurs when people in racial or ethnic groups vote
only for candidates of the same ethnic group. For example, if a city is 60% white and
40% black, in all elections the white candidate would receive 60% of the vote and the
black only 40%. See Engstrom & McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution
Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 URB. LAW. 369 (1985).
24. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that at-large and multimember districting schemes are similar. Therefore, at-
large arrangements, like multimember districts, are not unconstitutional per se. Id. at
1304; see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
25. At-large election systems give courts a sufficient basis to hear cases involving
vote discrimination. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142-44 (1971).
26. Vote dilution was the issue in Baker v. Carr, 398 U.S. 186 (1962), but the
Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case. The Court ruled that federal courts
did have jurisdiction in state vote dilution cases and remanded for a determination on
the merits. Id at 198-204, 237.
27. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
28. Id. at 568.
29. Id at 540.
30. Between 1900 and 1960, Lowndes County's population dropped from 35,651 to
15,417. The population of Bullock County declined from 31,944 to 13,462. During the
same period, Mobile County grew from 62,739 to 314,301 and Jefferson County ex-
panded from 140,420 to 634,864. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 447-48 (M.D. Ala.
1962).
31. Bullock County, with a population of 13,462, and Hendry County, consisting of
only 15,286, each had two representatives in the Alabama House of Representatives,
Mobile County, population 314,301, had only three representatives, and Jefferson
County, with 639,869, had only seven representatives. 377 U.S. at 545-46.
32. A reapportionment based on the decennial federal census is adequate to comply
with the equal protection clause. 377 U.S. at 583-84.
33. The Court wrote, "We do not mean to intimate that more frequent reapportion-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/11
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The Court ordered the state to reapportion its legislative districts 5 in
order to guarantee the principle of "one man, one vote.",3 6
After Reynolds, the Supreme Court determined what constitutes a
prima facie case of unconstitutional disparities in voting district popu-
lations.37 In White v. Regester, the court found that a population varia-
tion between districts of 9.9 percent was not a prima facie violation of
the equal protection clause. The Court also held that a state must jus-
tify any larger disparity in district population. 8 The Court reversed
the district court's decision 39 that population variance and multimem-
ber4' districts were per se unconstitutional. However, the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's decision that the election scheme
was improper based on the facts of this case.41 The Supreme Court
declared that the plaintiff's burden is to produce evidence that the mi-
nority had less opportunity to participate in the political process than
did other residents.42
ment [than decennial] would not be constitutionally permissible or practicably desira-
ble. But if reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency, it would assuredly
be constitutionally suspect." Id. at 584.
34. 377 U.S. at 568-71.
35. In addition to there being fewer representatives from the urban areas than rural
areas, it would be much more difficult for urban representatives to be responsive to their
constituents.
36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1972). The Reynolds court declared that,
while representation should be apportioned as equitably as possible, mechanical exact-
ness is not required. 377 U.S. at 577.
38. The court said that it would use the Reynolds guidelines if a larger variance
existed. A larger difference between districts would have to be justified "on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy ... ." Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 579.
39. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
40. Multimember voting schemes are most prevalent in state legislature elections. If
a legislature is apportioned on a county line basis, some counties would only have one
representative, whereas other, more populous counties would have several representa-
tives. Those representatives would be chosen by the whole county in an at-large
election.
41. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's findings that the Dallas Commit-
tee for Responsible Government (DCRG), a white-dominated organization that con-
trolled the Democratic Party in Dallas County, had not "exhibit[ed] good faith concern
for the political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro community." 412 U.S. at
767. The district court also found that "the black community ha[d] been effectively
excluded from participation in the Democratic primary process." Id. (quoting Graves,
343 F. Supp. at 726).
42. The White Court held:
1989]
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In Zimmer v. McKeithen,43 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals listed
several factors which would establish impermissible vote dilution.'
The plaintiff in Zimmer charged that at-large elections for police jurors
and school board members in their Louisiana parish impermissibly di-
luted the political strength of black residents.45 The court ruled that
the current apportionment scheme was discriminatory even though
there was a black population majority in the parish.46 The court held
that a plaintiff can show dilution exists by presenting a combination of
factors, such as a lack of access to the political process, unresponsive
legislators, a history of past discrimination, and an at-large voting
scheme.47 The court created what could best be described as a results
test: Minorities are not required to prove discriminatory intent so long
as the totality of the circumstances point to voting discrimination.48
Courts used this standard to attack the constitutionality of at-large
elections49 until the Supreme Court decided Mobile v. Bolden50 in
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation
by the group in question - that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legisla-
tors of their choice.
412 U.S. at 766.
43. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 1305; see generally O'Rourke, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to
Local At-Large Elections, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 39 (1982).
45. 485 F.2d at 1306.
46. Blacks were, however, the minority racial group among people registered to
vote. Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1302.
47. Id. at 1305.
48. The court said that dilution could be found
where the state policy favoring multi-member or at-large districting schemes is
rooted in racial discrimination. [Additionally], where a minority can demonstrate
a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legisla-
tors to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the prefer-
ence for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past
discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election sys-
tem, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of
large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and
the lack of provisions for at-large candidates running from particular geographical
subdistricts
Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305.
49. For example, the Fifth Circuit struck down an at-large election scheme for city
commissioners in Albany, Georgia. The court stated that Zimmer set the standards for
vote dilution cases. Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. See Blacksher, Drawing Single-Member Districts to Comply with the Voting
Rights Amendments of 1983, 17 URB. LAW. 347 (1985).
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1980.
In Mobile v. Bolden51 the Supreme Court effectively ended the con-
stitutional attack on at-large elections.52 Bolden involved a challenge
to Mobile's at-large city commission election system. Mobile's black
residents argued that the at-large system denied them equal protection
under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. In a plurality opinion,
Justice Stewart"3 held that plaintiffs must prove a discriminatory intent
in order to establish a constitutional violation.54 In essence, the Bolden
decision requires courts to examine the motives of legislators to deter-
mine whether the election system was devised or maintained for a dis-
criminatory purpose.55 The decision requires plaintiffs to show a
"smoking gun" pointing directly to intentional discrimination before
the court will overturn an at-large election scheme.56 The Bolden
court also held that Congress designed section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to track the fifteenth amendment. Therefore, the Bolden decision
crippled vote dilution litigation57 by requiring plaintiffs to prove dis-
criminatory intent before a court could conclude an election system
violated section 2."8
The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mobile v. Bolden. The Committee's report accompanying its
proposed amendment to the Voting Rights Act intended to restore the
51. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
52. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported that:
The impact of Bolden upon voting dilution litigation became apparent almost im-
mediately after the Court's decision was handed down on April 22, 1980. As the
Subcommittee heard throughout its hearings, after Bolden, litigators virtually
stopped filing new voting dilution cases. Moreover, the decision had a direct im-
pact on voting dilution cases that were making their way through the federal judi-
cial system.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26.
53. Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tice Powell. Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred separately in the plurality's re-
sult. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented.
54. Prior to Bolden, the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
The Washington court held that a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to allege
employment discrimination under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The Ar-
lington Heights decision required similar proof in the housing discrimination context.
55. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26-27.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62.
19891
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pre-Bolden legal standards59 for challenging a potentially discrimina-
tory voting scheme. The committee sought6° to restore the "results
test" developed in White v. Regester61 and Zimmer v. McKeithen.62
The report states that "the specific intent of this amendment [to section
2] is that plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results with-
out proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." 63 The Committee
rejected the strict standard of discriminatory intent required by the
Bolden court.64
Senators opposing the section 2 amendment were concerned that the
results test as written was so ambiguous that it provided no clear justi-
ciable standard, and that it might be construed to create a right to
proportional representation. 5 In order to expedite passage of the
amendment in the Senate, Senator Dole of Kansas introduced a substi-
tute bill.6 6 The "Dole Compromise" retained most of the results-test
59. The Committee wrote:
The amendment to the language of section 2 is designed to make clear that plain-
tiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or maintenance of the
challenged system or practice in order to establish a violation. Plaintiffs must
either prove such intent, or, alternatively, must show that the challenged system or
practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question,
results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27, 28.
60. Boyd & Markman, supra note 1, at 1382-89.
61. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for discussion of White.
62. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text for discussion of Zimmer.
63. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-28.
64. Id.
65. Hearings on the Voting Rights Act before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97 Cong., 2d Sess., vol. II, 82-84 (1982) [hereinafter
Hearings].
66. Senator Dole said:
With regard to the compromise itself, we are all aware that the most controver-
sial aspect of the committee's consideration of S. 1992 relates to section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Section 2 lies at the heart of the act insofar as it contains the
basic guarantee that the voting rights of our citizens should not be denied or
abridged on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority. In the
1980 case of Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court interpreted section 2 as prohib-
iting only intentional discrimination.
Proponents of the results standard... persuasively argue that intentional discrimi-
nation is too difficult to prove to make enforcement of the law effective. Perhaps
more importantly, they have asked, if the right to exercise a franchise has been
denied or abridged, why should plaintiffs have to prove that the deprivation of this
fundamental right was intentional. On the other hand, many on the committee
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/11
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language developed in White6 7 and Zimmer68 but added a specific dis-
claimer against proportional representation.69 After much discussion,
the compromise was adopted as the best way to ensure that the amend-
ment would not be misconstrued.70
The Committee report established a number of factors which, con-
sidered in concert, could establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act.
These factors include the degree of racial polarization, past discrimina-
tion, the effect of historical discrimination on life in the political entity,
and past minority political success.7 ' To prove a violation, plaintiffs
have expressed legitimate concerns that a results standard could be interpreted by
the courts to mandate proportional representation.
The supporters of this compromise believe that a voting practice or procedure
which is discriminatory in result should not be allowed to stand, regardless of
whether there exists a discriminatory purpose or intent. For this reason, the com-
promise retains the results standards .... However, we also feel that the legislation
should be strengthened with additional language delineating what legal standard
should apply under the results test and clarifying that it is not a mandate for pro-
portional representation. Thus, our compromise adds a new subsection to section
2, which codified language from the 1973 Supreme Court decision of White v.
Regester.
The new subsection clarifies as did White and previous cases, that the issue to be
decided is whether members of a protected class enjoy equal access. I think that is
the thrust of our compromise: equal access, whether it is open; equal access to the
political process; not whether they have achieved proportional election results.
The new subsection also provides, as did this White line of cases, that the extent to
which minorities have been elected to office is one circumstance which may be
considered. But it explicitly states - let me make that very clear - in the com-
promise that nothing in this section establishes a right to proportional
representation.
Id.
67. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for discussion of White.
68. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text for discussion of Zimmer.
69. See supra note 18 for text of amended act.
70. Senator Helms proposed an amendment which specifically would have allowed
proportional representation. The Senator stated that although he would oppose the
amendment, he wanted a vote on the record to show the Senate's intent that the amend-
ment not be construed to force proportional representation. 128 CONG. REc. 14,141
(1982) (statement of Sen. Helms).
71. The Senate Judiciary Committee listed the following factors in their report that
accompanied the bill in the Senate:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdi-
vision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to
vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
1989]
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could show a variety of factors depending on the rule, practice, or pro-
cedure at issue.72 The Committee pointed out that the factors are not
to be used as a "mechanical point counting device,"73 but that courts
should base their decisions on the totality of the circumstances, using
those factors that are relevant in each particular case.74
The impact of the 1982 amendments was immediate. In Rogers v.
Lodge,75 the Supreme Court rejected an at-large election system in
Georgia because it was discriminatory under the fourteenth amend-
ment.76 Although the Court acknowledged that plaintiffs must prove
intent in order to meet the Bolden standards,7 7 the recently amended
Voting Rights Act influenced the court's decision. In dissent, Justice
Powell revealed this influence by admitting that the majority opinion in
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimina-
tion against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employ-
ment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plain-
tiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials
to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such vot-
ing qualifications, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practices or procedure is
tenuous.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28-29.
72. Id
73. Id. at 29-30 n.118.
74. Id. The Committee noted that no one factor or combination of factors was an
automatic indicator of discrimination, but that the court should make that decision
based on the facts of each case.
75. 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (Supreme Court struck down the Burke County, Georgia
County Commission election scheme because it was maintained for invidious purposes
in violation of the fourteenth amendment).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 617-18.
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Rogers could not be reconciled with the Bolden decision.7 8
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that the majority's decision was
not sanctioned by precedent.79 Justice Stevens noted that Congress
had extensive discretion to legislate restrictions on discrimination.
The court erred, Stevens argued, by failing to identify acceptable stan-
dard with which to decide these cases. 80
Very likely, the majority realized in Rogers that Courts would aban-
don the Bolden8 intent test following the amendment to section 2.
Therefore, in order to avoid ignoring a very recent decision, the Court
attempted to reconcile Bolden with the new section 2 results test. The
Court held that the district court's application of the Zimmer82 "total-
ity of the circumstances" analysis established intentional, racially moti-
vated discrimination in the case at bar.83 Consequently, the Court held
the at-large election scheme unconstitutional.8 4
One of the first cases to consider the amended section 2 was United
States v. Marengo County Commission.85 The Marengo County Com-
mission and the Board of Education each had five members elected at-
large.86 While many blacks had run for office between 1966 and
1978,7 only one was elected during that period. 8 A group of blacks
78. Id. at 629.
79. Justice Stevens wrote:
In my opinion, there [could be no] doubt about the constitutionality of an amend-
ment to the Voting Rights Act that would require Burke County and other covered
jurisdictions to abandon specific kinds of at-large voting schemes that perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination. As against the reserved powers of the States,
Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of
racial discrimination in voting. . . .The Court's decision today, however, is not
based on either its own conception of sound policy or any statutory command.
Rogers, 458 U.S. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)).
80. Id. at 633.
81. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
82. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
83. 458 U.S. at 621-22.
84. Id. at 628.
85. 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984).
86. Prior to 1955, each body had a president elected at large and four members who
were elected from districts. In 1955, the state legislature enacted legislation which
called for all members of both bodies to be elected at large, as long as one person was
elected from each district. Id. at 1551-52.
87. There were 73 county-wide elections in which blacks ran against whites. Id.
88. One district elected a black county coroner over a white candidate in 1978. He
won the Democratic primary by a margin of 3,719 to 3,617. Additionally, the district
1989]
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filed a class action alleging that the Marengo County system unlawfully
diluted black votes.89
The Eleventh Circuit held that the system was discriminatory under
the amended section 2.90 First, the court held the amendment consti-
tutional. Next, the court applied the amendment's results test, noting
that it was "clearly an appropriate means for carrying out the goals of
the Civil War Amendments."91 While the court suggested that the Act
unconstitutionally restricts state rights, the court held that section 2
did not violate state's rights by limiting state powers to control
elections.
92
The Marengo court explained how the lower court should apply the
section 2 results test on remand. 93 The court declared that minority
plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation;
however, the court also held that at-large elections are not prohibited
per se. 94 Furthermore, the court held that a lack of proportional repre-
sentation does not necessarily imply discrimination. 95 The court stated
that the focus should be on the future opportunities the minority group
will have to participate in the political process, not whether they cur-
appointed another black to the school board. Both were reelected without opposition
after the case was tried. Id. at 1552.
89. Id. at 1552.
90. The Court stated, "Section 2 leaves state and local governments free to choose
the election system best suited to their needs, as long as that system provides equal
opportunities for effective participation by racial and language minorities." Id. at 1560.
91. Id. at 1560.
92. Id. The court declared that the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend-
ments explicitly granted to all blacks national citizenship and the associated right of
access to the voting process. Therefore, the amendments empower the federal govern-
ment to intervene in state and local affairs to protect the rights of minorities. The court
also stated:
The states have an important interest in determining their election practices.
But Congress could reasonably conclude that practices with discriminatory results
had to be prohibited to reduce the risk of constitutional violations and the perpetu-
ation of past violations. Today it is a small thing and not a great intrusion into
state autonomy to require the states to live up to their obligation to avoid discrimi-
natory practices in the election process.
Id. at 1561.
93. Id. at 1565 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 36). See supra note 71 for
a list of factors.
94. Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1565.
95. Id. at 1566.
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rently receive inadequate public services.9 6
While acknowledging that a dilution claim should be based on a "to-
tality of the circumstances" and that no factor is indispensible,9 7 the
Marengo court indicated that racially polarized voting would ordina-
rily be the keystone of a dilution case.9 8 Absent this voting pattern,
black candidates would not be denied office simply because they were
black.99 The Senate emphasized that Congress intended section 2 to
remedy existing race-conscious politics, not to create it. 'I In the Ma-
rengo case, plaintiffs were able to prove a race-conscious voting pattern
through direct statistical analysis of vote returns.101
The court also considered past discrimination and its lingering ef-
fects 1°2 and improper election practices.10 3 The court observed that
past discrimination can severely impair current minority participation
in the political process. Even if all discrimination were eliminated, the
lingering effects of past discrimination cause some present socio-eco-
nomic disadvantages." °  Additionally, the low number of black poll
officials'0 5 and the failure of the election registrar to obey the registra-
96. Id (citing Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446
U S. 951 (1980)).
97. Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1567.
98. Id. at 1567 n.34.
99. Id.
100. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.
101. Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1569-70.
102. At the time the decision was released, the county school system was under
judicial supervision. In 1978, when the Marengo case was originally tried, the district
court called the Board of Education "obdurately obstinate in its opposition to desegre-
gation. The judicial opinions recording the efforts of the United States and private
plaintiffs to desegregate the public schools of this small, rural county would fill a small
volume." Id. at 1568 (citations omitted).
103. Id. In addition to official discriminatory acts, the political organizations acted
in a discriminatory fashion. "[Iln 1978, only 7 of the 34 members of the Marengo
County Democratic Executive Committee were black." Id. at 1569.
104. The courts have recognized that disproportionate educational[,] employment,
income level[,] and living conditions arising from past discrimination tend to de-
press minority political participation.... Where these conditions are shown, and
where the level of black participation is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any
further causal nexus between their disparate socio-economic status and the de-
pressed level of political participation.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29 n. 114. See also Major v. Treen 574 F. Supp. 325,
351 n.31 (E.D. La. 1983) (inequality of political assess can be inferred from economic
inequalities).
105. The court found that black poll watchers should be present to instill confidence
in the electoral system. 731 F.2d at 1569-70.
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tion laws1" 6 contributed to a finding of vote dilution.10 7
The Supreme Court upheld section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
Thornburg v. Gingles.0 s Gingles involved a redistricting plan for
North Carolina which included several multimember' 0 9 districts.110
The Court ruled that, based on the "totality of the circumstances" 11
test and the Court's new threshold test,112 the North Carolina reappor-
tionment plan was unlawful. 3
The Court established a three-part test to analyze a vote dilution
case.1 4 First, the minority group challengers must demonstrate that
they are sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single member district.115 Second, the minority group
must show that it is politically cohesive.116 Third, the minority must
demonstrate that the majority group votes as a bloc to defeat the mi-
nority's preferred candidate. 1 7 Plaintiffs must show that votes are cast
along racial lines before the court will consider a claim."1 If these
106. Citizens could only register to vote in Linden, the county seat. The county
board and registrars would not visit outlying areas to register rural voters who were
predominantly black. These factors tended to affect blacks more than whites; therefore
they indicated dilution because they impaired minority access to the political system.
Id. at 1570.
107. The court also considered the lack of political success of minority candidates
and the majority's unresponsiveness to the needs of the minority. Id. at 1570-73.
108. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
109. See supra note 40 for discussion of multimember districts.
110. 478 U.S. at 42.
111. See supra note 59-74 and accompanying text for discussion of "totality of cir-
cumstances" test.
112. See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text for discussion of the threshold
test.
113. 478 U.S. at 80.
114. Id at 46-47.
115. If the minority could not be a majority in a single member integrated district,
then the "multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for the minority vot-
ers' inability to elect its candidates." The minority voters must at least possess the
potential to elect a representative if the challenged voting structure were not in place.
Id.
116. If the minority is not cohesive, it is unlikely that there would be a distinctive
minority group interest that one candidate could espouse. Id. at 51.
117. Id
118. The court wrote:
In sum, we would hold that the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it
relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a correlation be-
tween the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not
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three factors are not met, no charge of race dilution could stand.' 19
The Court also established the supporting factors which lower courts
may consider in a vote dilution claim. One factor is the degree of elec-
tion success of protected class members. 120 It is also imperative to
consider the circumstances surrounding recent black electoral suc-
cess. '2 Additionally, past discrimination and appeals to racial bias in
political campaigns "are supportive of, but not essential to, a minority
voter's claim."' 122
The Gingles Court thus clarified the important factors to consider in
vote dilution cases. The judiciary may interfere with a state's auton-
omy if the state does not equitably consider these factors. Although
the court must allow the state some leeway in choosing its form of
government, 23 if election systems with a less discriminatory impact
exist, then states may be required to implement them.
In Dillard v. Crenshaw County, Alabama,124 the Eleventh Circuit im-
plied that as long as fair options exist, 125 the court may reject systems
which merely hint at discrimination. Crenshaw county has an overall
black population of 17.6 percent and a black voting population of 15.9
percent. Both parties stipulated that the present three-member county
commission elected at-large was discriminatory.126 The county recom-
mended the establishment of a five-member commission elected by dis-
tricts and a commission chair elected at large.'27 This scheme would
prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting
and defendants may not rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent.
Id. at 61.
119. Id. at 45.
120. Id. at 75 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29). The court should con-
sider whether a minority candidate has ever been elected. Id.
121. The court noted that majority members could manipulate the statistics by
electing a "safe minority candidate," one whom the majority put up for election and
could control. Id. at 62.
122. Id. at 48 n.15.
123. See supra note 90 for consideration of state's rights.
124. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246 (1lth Cir. 1987).
125. If alternative electoral schemes are available that would be racially fair and
also serve the interests of the community, the district should choose the best of those
options.
126. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
127. The county proposed that the chair preside at commission meetings and only
vote in case of a tie. However, there were very few concrete plans for the position. The
county declared that the position would involve executive and administrative, but not
legislative duties. The court feared the position would become legislative, which would
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have provided for a district with a sixty-five percent black population,
which would probably result in black representation on the commis-
sion.128 The district court rejected this plan because it would have un-
lawfully diluted the vote for commission chair.'2 9  The court
recommended that the county rotate the commission chair among the
five district commissioners. 130
The Dillard decision indicates that courts must always be cognizant
of discriminatory maneuvers. Although a chair elected at large would
not be inherently unfair, a rotating chair is also equitable. While an at
large election is not discriminatory per se, if another fair method exists
that is not potentially discriminatory, the alternative is preferable. If
several fair methods exist, the district should choose the one with the
least discriminatory potential.
The Gingles Court established a fair, sensible threshold test for deter-
mining vote dilution. If the minority group could not elect the candi-
date of its choice because, notwithstanding the district boundaries, it is
too small or divisive, there would be no inquiry into the electoral pro-
cedures. If, however, the minority group had the voting power to put
its candidate into office, it will be given the opportunity. At its most
basic, the Gingles test should clear the way for electing representatives
who better reflect their constituency.
Ideally, there would be no need for the Gingles test. For a race dilu-
tion charge to stand, voters must cast their ballots along racial lines.
So long as this unfortunate voting behavior persists, the Gingles test is a
necessary instrument in the effort to dismantle racial barriers.
It is imperative that minority vote dilution be eliminated in the
United States. The courts and Congress must stand by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act in Gingles. Allowance
of any retreat in the drive for voting equality may reverse all that has
been achieved. As Justice Douglas wrote:
The Constitution and Bill of Rights [guarantee to personal and
spiritual self-fulfillment] is not self-executing. As nightfall does
not come at once, neither does oppression. In both instances,
there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged.
make the chair simply a sixth commissioner. Therefore the court indicated the chair
should not be elected at large. Id.
128. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987).
129. 649 F. Supp. at 297. The court held that under this system, the commission
would be completely beyond the reach of blacks. Id.
130. Id. at 296.
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And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of
change in the air - however slight - lest we become unwitting
victims of the darkness.1
3 1
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